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Chapter 8.
Confronting Maritime Crime in Southeast Asian Waters:
Re-examining ‘Piracy’ in the 21st Century
Sam Bateman

There is nothing new about maritime crime in Southeast Asia. It has a
long history and the maritime criminals of today are mainly descendants of the
marauders, pirates, and bandits of yesteryear. However, changes to the extent
and nature of maritime crime have occurred over the years. The decline in fish
stocks and loss of access to traditional fishing grounds, along with general
economic problems, has led to unemployment and loss of income in coastal
villages throughout the region. This has, in turn, forced some villagers to turn
to piracy, sea robbery, and other forms of maritime crime. However, these
villagers are often just the “foot soldiers” organized by opportunistic
businessmen or criminal gangs.
Most criminal groups—including so-called pirates—engage in several
different types of criminal activity. There is no strict demarcation between
people involved in piracy and those involved in other forms of maritime
crime. Many are non-professional criminals, such as fishermen and traditional
barter traders, engaged in low-level crime, making money by, for example,


Some parts of this chapter are based on field research and interviews in Kuala Lumpur,
Jakarta, Manila, and Singapore in October-November 2006, conducted by the author and Mr.
John McFarlane, Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian
National University, for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Mr McFarlane’s input is
gratefully acknowledged.

smuggling cigarettes from Indonesia to Malaysia to avoid paying excise taxes.
The networks involved are not large, and tend to be family or village oriented.
Smuggling has been going on for generations and continues to the present
day, especially where people on both sides of modern borders share the same
ethnicity and family ties.
Transnational organized crime has also increased across Southeast
Asia. Processes of globalization, convenient international travel, information
processing, electronic transfers of funds, and ready access to secure
communications have facilitated transnational crime just as much in Southeast
Asia as they have elsewhere in the world. Due to the archipelagic geography
of the region and the difficulties of policing sea routes and maritime borders,
the sea is the main medium for the illegal movement of people and goods.
Hence, organized crime in Southeast Asia invariably has a significant
maritime dimension.
“Legitimacy” for maritime crime is sometimes provided by political or
religious causes, as well as by the developments in globalization that might
facilitate transnational collusion between different radical groups and
separatist movements. What might have been purely local causes in the past
can now more readily take on a global dimension. In many instance also,
colonial lines of demarcation cut across traditional family and ethnic
groupings, and much of today’s illegal activity at sea, particularly smuggling

and illegal people movement, is only “illegal” by virtue of contemporary,
rather than traditional, border controls and trade regulations.
Recent concerns with maritime crime in Southeast Asia has been with
piracy and armed robbery against ships. Such activities have provoked
international interest as they are assessed as threats to the free movement of
shipping and seaborne trade. They have also led to speculation that because
piracy and sea robbery occur in the region, there could be a higher risk of
maritime terrorist attack. However, there are few grounds to conflate piracy
and maritime terrorism.1 With hindsight also, it may be argued that the risks
posed by piracy and sea robbery to international shipping in the region have
been exaggerated.
The focus on measures to reduce risks of piracy and sea robbery in the
region has served to distort the picture with maritime crime more generally. It
ignores the links between different kinds of maritime crime and that the
perpetrators of different criminal activities at sea are often one and the same.
It has also led to a concentration on patrolling at sea, which at best is a
deterrent measure, rather than on policing activities onshore. This chapter
examines the “bigger picture” by examining all forms of maritime crime in
Southeast Asia, rather than just focusing on piracy and sea robbery, and
suggests some possible actions to deal with the entire range of maritime
crime.
1

Adam Young and Mark J. Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia:
Rectitude and Utility,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.25, No.2, August 2003, 269-283.

Maritime Crime in Southeast Asia

People in the coastal villages of Sumatra, Java, Malaysia, the Riau
Islands, and the Sulu Archipelago have a tradition of what is regarded by
modern standards as maritime criminality. They have long been involved in
piracy, smuggling, piracy, and trafficking in commodities and people.
International borders in these areas were unknown in the past, although there
would have been long-standing recognition of where the limits of traditional
lands, waters or rights existed.
The practice of smuggling, trafficking, and seeking employment away
from home areas has not stopped, merely because colonial and post-colonial
administrations have established national borders. In addition, in many areas,
the people on both sides of a modern border—for example, between Sumatra
and peninsula Malaysia, or between Sabah and the southern Philippines—may
be closely related, speak the same language, and have far more in common
with each other than the administration in their faraway national capitals.
There is still a tradition of unregulated cross-border movement by
local people wherever border demarcation is uncertain and the means of
enforcing it are weak. For example, a family group wishing to visit relatives
across the sea may not bother about the formality of border controls, and
understandably may take “gifts” along with them. Much of this activity is

relatively harmless but it can assume more dangerous proportions, particularly
when drugs or arms are involved.
Smuggling and the movement of people both have a long history in
Southeast Asia. It is frequently regarded as an extension of the historic trading
arrangements between neighbours that is still conducted through the barter
trading system. It is particularly prevalent in the Sulu Sea area and the
Malacca Strait. Effective bilateral or trilateral cooperation in the area appears
limited. There are difficulties in intercepting and arresting people engaged in
smuggling and illegal border crossings.
Smuggling in the Sulu Sea area has been increasing rapidly,
particularly from the Philippine side. It involves cigarettes, illegal immigrants,
sex trafficking, and other valuable commodities, including drugs. There is also
widespread smuggling of subsidized diesoline and kerosene from Malaysia to
Indonesia, particularly through Penang.2 Other smuggled goods include
alcohol and motorcycles. Traditional fishermen might undertake the
smuggling, but the real masterminds are located on shore and keep themselves
at “arms length” from the illegal activity.
Illegal people movement in the region may be either short-term for
family reunions or other social visits, or long-term mainly to seek work.
Malaysia is particularly concerned about illegal migration by sea across the
2

Diesel is a very profitable commodity to smuggle from Malaysia to Indonesia. At this
stage, due to subsidies, diesel in Malaysia costs about 1/8 that in Indonesia. As a result, there
is a healthy diesel smuggling operation from peninsula Malaysia to Sumatra. Malaysian-based
Taiwanese fishing boats and Malaysian fishing vessels are believed also to refuel other fishing
vessels at sea.

Malacca Strait from Indonesia or down the Strait from Thailand, Myanmar, or
Bangladesh.3 With strong and long-standing traditional family links across the
Malacca Strait and the Sulu Sea, people moving across colonial boundaries do
not regard themselves as illegal immigrants. There is much traditional
movement of people by sea between southern Philippines and Sabah, as well
as the movement of people between Sumatra, Malaysia, and southern
Thailand. These movements may be exploited both by criminal and terrorist
groups.
Registration of aliens is a significant problem in the Philippines, where
there are many Indonesians, particularly in islands around Mindanao. There
are known links between these people and smuggling and terrorist activities.
The Philippines also has illegal immigrants from China and India who may be
involved in the sale of smuggled goods, financial crimes, and other forms of
criminal activity. All types of smuggling in the Philippines are inter-related.
Cross border regulation (including the regulation of ferry traffic), particularly
in the Sulu Sea region, is weak. People move illegally into the Philippines
from East Kalimintan through Sandakan and the Sulu archipelago to
Zamboanga and elsewhere in Mindanao; and from Manado in North Sulawesi
through the Greater Sunda Islands to General Santos and Cotabato in
Mindanao.
Drug and Arms Trafficking
3

Sumathy Permal, “Trafficking in the Strait of Malacca,” Maritime Studies 156,
September/October 2007, 6.

Trafficking in drugs by sea remains a major source of income for
many transnational organized criminal groups. Myanmar remains the major
source country for opiates—principally heroin—in Southeast Asia, but small
amounts are also produced in Laos.4 Cannabis is trafficked in the region,
especially to Malaysia. Sometimes this has involved land routes, but more
frequently it has involved transfers at sea, or simply floating the product
ashore. Cannabis is also widely smuggled in the Philippines. The New
Peoples’ Army (NPA) is active in cultivating cannabis, especially in the
northern Philippines.
There is an increasing problem in the region with the manufacture and
trafficking in methamphetamines (“ice”) and other amphetamine type
stimulants (ATS) from Myanmar and other Asia-Pacific countries, including
China, India, and North Korea. “Ice” has replaced heroin as the most lethal
drug in the region, and its manufacture and use is increasing. Shabu
(crystalline methamphetamine hydrochloride or ice) is the major drug of
choice in the Philippines, with drug factories in the central Philippines, mainly
resourced from China or Taiwan. This is a worrying trend because the
physiological impact of “ice” is far more serious than that of heroin, cocaine,
cannabis, ecstasy, or other ATS. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, which are
4

Some 90% of the world’s opium production is grown in Afghanistan, mainly in Helmand
Province. However, most of this product, in the form of heroin, is trafficked through Iran, the
Caucuses, Central Asia and the Middle East into Russia and Europe. It appears that very little
Afghan heroin is trafficked into Southeast Asia and beyond.

major precursor chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamines and
other ATS, are manufactured in China and India, and moved mostly by sea.
Small arms trafficking in Southeast Asia is “an integral part of broader
transnational crime that includes terrorism, drug trafficking, money
laundering, piracy and human trafficking.”5 Small arms are widely available
in the region and trafficking by sea is the preferred means of movement. Past
conflicts in Indochina have provided a major source of small arms and light
weapons. Thefts of weapons from military bases and police stations are
common, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, and small arms are
also manufactured both legally and illegally in the region, particularly again in
the Philippines.
Due to Thailand’s geographical characteristics, its role in the
Cambodian conflict, and its relatively open society, Thailand is “an ideal point
of origin and transit in the trafficking of small arms.”6 Because of the troubles
in Aceh, the GAM was a major recipient of small arms and light weapons
smuggled across the Malacca Strait from Thailand. Arms have also flowed to
the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka through southern Thailand.7 A former
Indonesian military officer was arrested in the United States in 2006 in

5

Rizal Sukma, “The Problem of Small Arms in Southeast Asia: An Overview,” in Philipe
Jusario Vermonte (ed), Small is (not) beautiful: The problem of small arms in Southeast Asia,
Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2004, 9.
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Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Small Arms Trafficking in Southeast Asia: A Perspective from
Thailand,” in Vermonte, Small is (not) beautiful, 60.
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Ibid., 67-68

connection with arms smuggling to the LTTE in Sri Lanka.8 Sri Lanka
remains concerned about Indonesia being a conduit for the smuggling of
firearms from Southern Thailand to the LTTE.
The Philippines has plenty of weapons available. These include
domestically produced small arms and weapons stolen or “sold” from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The domestic arms manufacturing
industry produces weapons both legally and illegally, with some illegal
exports to criminal groups in Japan and Korea. The trade is managed by
criminal syndicates and is largely carried by sea in containers rather than by
small boat. A common route for terrorists, firearms, and explosives coming
into Indonesia from the Philippines, through Sabah, is via Palu in Central
Sulawesi, and then to Surabaya in Java (probably by boat) or onwards to
Jakarta or other destinations in Indonesia.
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major factor
underpinning the incidence of maritime crime in Southeast Asia. Illegal
trafficking occurs across the Malacca Strait and the Andaman Sea from
southern Thailand into Aceh, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, and is also
prevalent into and out of the Philippines. Measures to control trafficking in
small arms might assist in reducing the levels of violence used in acts of
piracy and sea robbery. Given the proliferation of small arms and light

8

Brian White, “Six indicted in arms brokering for Tamil Tigers and Indonesia,” Associated
Press, 29 September 2006.

weapons in Southeast Asia, it is not surprising to find that pirates and armed
robbers are making greater use of them.9

The Threat of Illegal Fishing

Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing has become a
serious problem in the region, especially for Indonesia. With the depleted fish
stocks in the region, many coastal villagers have lost their basic means of
livelihood, and are tempted into illegal activity. With the devolution of powers
to regional governments in Indonesia, there is less central oversight of
fisheries enforcement.10
The fishing industry in Malaysia is more sophisticated than that in
Indonesia. As the fish stocks in the area are seriously depleted, Malaysian
fishermen are tempted to cross into Indonesian claimed waters to exploit the
fish stocks there, using their larger vessels and more sophisticated techniques.
This exposes them to harassment, extortion, and arrest by Indonesian law
enforcement officials who may be acting corruptly, as well as engaging in
some “bush justice.” The experience of the Hutan Melintang fishing
community suggests that the rate of these predations with the robbery and
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Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond, Joshua Ho, Safety and Security in the Malacca and
Singapore Straits—An Agenda for Action. (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic
Studies, May 2006), 25-26.
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Dirhamsyah, “Maritime Law Enforcement and Compliance in Indonesia: Problems and
Recommendations,” Maritime Studies 144, September/October 2005, 9.

informal detentions of Malaysian fishermen and fishing vessels by Indonesian
law enforcement personnel has not declined.11
Illegal activity could involve the village or district tauke (towkay)
system. Tauke is a Chinese (Hokkien dialect) word for “boss” or “business
proprietor.” Within each kampong, there is a recognized business leader, and
the taukes manage the local fishing and other production sharing systems in
Malaysia, Indonesia, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, including in Aceh and
the Riau Islands. Taukes are invariably of Chinese ethnicity, reflecting the
long involvement of ethnic Chinese in managing fishing activities in the
Malacca Strait.12 They are usually the masterminds behind smuggling and
other illegal maritime operations, even while they use the local villagers as
“foot soldiers,” thus keeping themselves at “arms length” from the illegal
activity.
While the tauke is not necessarily the headman of the kampong, he
effectively controls the “business” activities undertaken in the kampong.
Some—but certainly not all—taukes have criminal associations, and they
become the link through which more sophisticated organized crime might
operate in, for example, people smuggling, cigarette or diesel smuggling,
illegal fishing or piracy. It is very difficult to counter the criminal role of the
tauke because they have a very powerful position in the kampong and act as
11

J.N. Mak, “Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen: Reassessing the Dynamics of Maritime
Piracy in the Malacca Straits,” Paper presented at the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power
Conference 2008, Sydney, 29-31 January 2008, 17.
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John G. Butcher, The Closing of the Frontier – A History of the Marine Fisheries of
Southeast Asia c. 1850-2000, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 80-83.

the link between the poor and the wealthy, the fishermen and the businessmen,
and possibly, the criminals and the military.

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

Although many types of maritime crime may be increasing, including
smuggling of goods and people, piracy and armed robbery against ships in
Southeast Asia has actually gone down significantly in recent years. For
example, the “phantom ship” phenomenon, when a ship is hijacked and
subsequently given a false identity and documentation prior to being sold or
used for further trading, has been largely solved with the introduction of ship
identification numbers (SINs) and continuous synoptic records (CSRs) by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO). Because of these international
reforms, it has become much more difficult to give a ship a false identity.
As mentioned above, the number of reported piracy attacks in the
region has trended steadily downwards from 2004 to the present. Table 1
shows the number of attacks (actual and attempted) in Southeast Asia for each
year from 2000 to 2007. The large number of attacks in 2000, particularly in
the Malacca Strait, may be attributed to two main factors. First, it may have
been a consequence of the economic downturn of the late 1990s with more
people turning to sea robbery for income, and secondly, several high profile

pirate attacks in the late 1990s might have drawn increased attention to piracy,
and this may have led to some increased reporting of incidents.

Table 1
Piracy in Southeast Asia – Actual and Attempted Attacks
2000-2007
Location
Cambodia/Vietnam
Indonesia
Malacca Strait
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore Strait
Thailand
Myanmar/Burma
South China Sea
TOTAL

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total
6
8
12
15
4
10
3
5
63
119
91 103 121
94
79
50
43
700
75
17
18
28
38
12
11
7
206
21
19
14
5
9
3
10
9
90
9
8
10
12
4
0
6
6
55
5
7
5
2
8
7
5
3
42
8
8
5
2
4
1
1
2
31
5
3
0
0
1
0
0
0
9
9
4
0
2
8
6
1
3
33
257 165 167 187 170 118
87
78 1229

Source: IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Annual Reports,
Table 1

Reservations should be noted about the statistics from the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB). On the one hand, there could be some underreporting of attacks. Both the IMB and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) have noted the reluctance by some shipmasters and ship
owners to report incidents due to concerns that any investigation might disrupt
the ship’s schedule, and insurance premiums might increase. Under-reporting
may also occur because attacks on local craft, such as fishing boats, barges
and small barter vessels may not be reported to the IMB.13 This under-

13

Mak, 4.

reporting might, for example, partly explain the lack of reported attacks in the
Philippines in 2005, as shown in Table 1.
On the other hand, over-reporting is also possible. Many incidents
constitute either unsuccessful attempts to board or petty theft—of small items
such as paint, mooring ropes, or outboard motors—from vessels in port or at
anchor. These may previously have gone unreported, but are now reported due
to the publicity given to this form of maritime crime and greater awareness of
the reporting channels available. The IMB statistics may also be inflated by
the propensity of ships to report any close approach by a small craft as an
“attempted attack,” and by the lack of follow-up by the IMB to determine
whether an attack was in fact an actual attack.14
There are several reasons for the improved situation. National and
regional responses, including increased patrolling and surveillance, have been
important, although operations at sea mainly have a deterrent effect and few
pirates or sea robbers are actually caught at sea. Tighter government control
and local policing onshore are other factors that have contributed to the
improved situation, as well as greater awareness generally in the shipping
industry of the importance of security, following the introduction of the

14

According to the IMB, the feeder container ship Sinar Merak was attacked on 22 January
2007 in the Malacca Strait after leaving Belawan for Singapore. However, subsequent
investigations by Singapore security agencies revealed that the two persons found onboard the
Sinar Merak were actually innocent Indonesian fishermen who were survivors of a small craft
that was run down by the container ship manoeuvring aggressively to avoid a suspected
attack. Nevertheless, the IMB continues to show this incident as an actual attack in the
Malacca Strait. ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, Report for January 2007, Singapore,
11.

International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code adopted by the IMO
in 2002.
The vast majority of attacks in the region are on vessels at anchor, in
port or entering or leaving a harbor. For example, of the 78 actual and
attempted attacks in 2007, 52 were on vessels that were not at sea. These
attacks are usually of a minor nature and are best countered by more effective
policing by port authorities, including active patrolling of ports and
anchorages. Some international involvement through assistance with building
the capacity of local authorities may be useful.
Most high value seaborne trade in Southeast Asia is carried in larger
vessels transiting the region, while the majority of successful attacks occur
almost entirely on small vessels; most attacks are on smaller, more vulnerable
vessels carrying trade within the region, or on local fishing and trading
vessels, as well as cruising yachts. Larger vessels gain considerable protection
from their size and speed. Most modern merchant ships engaged in
international trade travel at speeds in excess of fourteen knots, and it is both
difficult and dangerous for small craft to attempt to approach them at this
speed.
With the exception of security in some ports and anchorages, piracy
and sea robbery in the region appears to be under control. The measures taken
by regional countries both at sea and onshore have largely been effective
although security in ports and anchorages in some countries, and policing

generally against maritime crime, could still be improved. There are no
grounds for the operational involvement of non-regional countries in
providing security at sea against piracy and sea robbery in Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, contributions from non-regional countries would still assist in
building the capacity of regional countries to provide security in ports,
anchorages, and littoral waters.

Maritime Terrorism

In Southeast Asia, the vulnerability of the maritime sector to attack by
terrorists has been of concern due to the economic importance of the sector;
the incidence of piracy and sea robbery in the region; and the presence of
terrorist groups with either a history of attacking maritime targets or possibly
an intent to launch such attacks. Also, as target hardening occurs on land,
maritime targets might become more attractive to terrorist groups.
Possible scenarios in Southeast Asia range from highly speculative and
most unlikely to credible.15 The more spectacular scenarios tend to be based
on inadequate knowledge of the operating environment. Most commonly
postulated is the notion that the Malacca and Singapore straits could be
physically blocked. The traffic separation scheme (TSS) in the vicinity of One
Fathom Bank off Port Klang in the Malacca Strait is 0.6 nautical miles wide
15

Sam Bateman, “Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific,” Security Challenges,
Vol.2, No.3, October 2006, 77-92.

and this is often identified as an area where the strait could be blocked.
However, the distance from coast to coast outside the TSS is much greater and
would still allow the passage of most vessels. The most likely cause of
diverting traffic away from the straits would be if the shipping community
considers the straits insecure, perhaps due a threat like sea mining, rather from
than the physical blocking of passage.
The more catastrophic scenarios highlight possible attacks on liquid
natural gas (LNG) or liquid petroleum gas (LPG) tankers, either through the
planting of devices onboard or by the use of a tanker as a mobile weapon to
strike secondary targets. Such attacks seem improbable due to the technical
complexities involved, and the opportunity and expertise required for such an
attack. Although such a scenario is unlikely, its potential is given
disproportionate focus due to the results such an attack might produce.
The main maritime terrorist threat in the region is usually seen as coming
from Al-Qaeda and its associated groups in Southeast Asia, particularly Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). These groups have camps in
the southern Philippines where they train together and share expertise. Group
members routinely move between Sabah, Indonesian Borneo, and these camps
by speedboat, local craft, and ferries. The ASG in the Philippines has already
shown that it can conduct bomb attacks against ships. It claimed responsibility

for the Superferry 14 attack,16 and was blamed for the bomb attack on the ferry
Dona Ramona in August 2005, as the ship was about to depart from
Zamboanga.17
These attacks show that ferries, and potentially cruise liners, are
vulnerable to attack. With passenger ships and ferries, it is not so much the bomb
that might do the damage but rather the fire and panic that can follow an
explosion with so many people in a relatively confined area.18 Measures to
defeat attacks against ferries are a national responsibility involving for example,
better screening of passengers and their luggage and enhanced security onboard.
The potential for cooperation between pirates and terrorists is often
overstated with writings that emphasize possible linkages between pirates and
terrorists.19 Piracy and maritime terrorism might involve a similar modus
operandi by the attackers, but piracy is conducted for private ends while
terrorism has political motives. In assessments of the risk of maritime terrorism,
pirates have been seen as having skills and expertise that might be attractive to a
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The Superferry 14 sank in February 2004 near Manila after a bomb explosion and fire
onboard. It constitutes the most serious act of maritime terrorism so far in terms of loss of life
with 116 people killed or missing. Other attacks on ferries in Southeast Asia include the
February 2000 bombing of the Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrix, which killed forty
people; and the December 2001 bombing of the Indonesian ferry Kailifornia, which killed ten.
John F. Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast
Asia,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2005, Vol. 58, No. 3, 67.
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“Ferry Blast Injures 30 in Southern Philippines,” The New York Times online, 28 August
2005.
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Sam Bateman, “Ferry Safety: A Neglected Aspect of Maritime Security?” IDSS
Commentaries 31/2006, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 3 May 2006).
19
For example, Graham Gerard Ong, “Ships Can Be Dangerous, Too: Coupling Piracy and
Terrorism in Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security Framework,” in Derek Johnson and Mark
Valencia (eds), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses, (Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 45-76.

terrorist group, but these are not particularly specialised and are readily
available. There are many former naval personnel, fishermen, and commercial
seafarers in Southeast Asia with knowledge and experience that could be used
by a terrorist group.

Regional Solutions to Maritime Crime

Rather than seeing each of the different types of maritime crime
mentioned in the preceding sections in isolation, the real challenge is to
understand their root causes and to choose appropriate responses in a more
holistic manner. Measures to control maritime crime in the region should not be
focused solely on piracy prevention and the risks of maritime terrorism.
Recognizing the interests of all stakeholders, they should also encompass other
illegal activities at sea, such as the prevention of trafficking in arms, drugs, and
people, as well as the operational dimensions of maritime safety, search and
rescue (SAR), and marine environmental protection.
There are relatively few agreed maritime boundaries in Southeast Asia.
Of the nearly sixty maritime boundaries required in the region, less than 20%
have so far been settled. Indonesia is one regional country that has very
assiduously pursued agreements on maritime boundaries with its neighbors. In
sharp contrast, the Philippines has no agreed maritime boundaries with any of its
neighbors. Very few exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundaries have been

drawn in the region. The lack of maritime boundaries complicates enforcement
against crimes at sea generally, while the lack of EEZ boundaries makes
enforcement against illegal fishing difficult.
Little progress is being made with delimiting outstanding maritime
boundaries in Southeast Asia. Reaching agreement on them is both necessary
and difficult. Trilateral negotiations, and perhaps even multilateral negotiations,
are required because some end points for the boundaries need to be agreed
between three or more countries.20 Regional countries should move
expeditiously to resolve existing maritime boundary disputes to ensure that
jurisdiction can be exercised properly at sea. If boundaries cannot be resolved,
countries should be prepared to enter into some form of provisional
arrangements for the maintenance of law and order in the disputed area without
prejudice to their positions in the boundary negotiations. Bilateral agreements
between neighboring countries are essential for the reduction of illegal migration
and smuggling.
Because most likely maritime boundaries lack an historical basis, local
cultural, social, and economic circumstances must also be recognized in
border areas. Freedom of traditional movement and trade should be respected
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When several countries are opposite and/or adjacent to each other, a bilateral boundary
between any two of them will inevitably reach a point where it intersects with the claim of
another country (or countries). This is the situation in most seas of Southeast Asia and in the
Gulf of Thailand. A commonly applied principle is to terminate the agreed boundary near the
point of intersection (a theoretical tripoint), and then leave the precise position of the tripoint
to subsequent trilateral negotiations. Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime
Political Boundaries of the World, 2nd ed., (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 312,

in agreed border control arrangements rather than simply classifying these
activities as smuggling or illegal people movement.

National Maritime Law Enforcement

Maritime jurisdiction and enforcement are extremely complex issues,
particularly in areas where maritime boundaries are not agreed. This is a
special problem in key regional hotspots for maritime crime, such as the
Malacca and Singapore straits, and the Sulu and Celebes Seas. Crimes at sea
are often transnational, with more than one national jurisdiction involved. A
state’s criminal jurisdiction varies with the legal type of jurisdiction. This
might be as a flag state over vessels flying its flag, as a coastal state over
waters under national jurisdiction, as a port state over vessels in its internal
waters, as an archipelagic or straits state, as a state of nationality of people or
organizations engaged in illegal activities, or as a state exercising jurisdiction
on the high seas as permitted by international law.
Regional countries face difficulties in combating illegal activities at
sea due to a shortage of trained personnel, a lack of modern equipment, the
obsolescence or inadequacy of much national legislation, and the weak
maritime law enforcement capability of national agencies.21 Problems also
arise from the lack of interagency coordination and duplication of effort

21
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between agencies; some regional countries, notably Indonesia and the
Philippines, have a number of different agencies dealing with some areas of
maritime security without adequate arrangements for coordination. Lastly, any
form of investigation or intelligence collection in the coastal areas where
criminal networks exist will be fraught with many difficulties, including
personal risk to the police involved.
As the largest archipelagic state in the world, Indonesia is very much
aware of the extent of its maritime interests and of the need to protect its
maritime sovereignty and to maintain law and order at sea. However, its
efforts have been thwarted by the lack of capacity to conduct security
operations, and by the lack of coordination between the various government
agencies that have responsibility for some aspect of maritime enforcement. At
least ten agencies have been identified as involved in maritime security
management with nine authorized to conduct law enforcement operations at
sea.22 The situation has been further complicated since the collapse of the
Suharto Government by government reforms, including the autonomy laws
that involve devolution of authority to provincial governments, including
some responsibility for law enforcement at sea. Mak considers that “the
Indonesian decentralization process has led not only to more autonomy for

22

Ibid., Table 1, 3.

agencies such as the military and the police, but also to a greater lack of
accountability.”23
Malaysia has been most successful in recent years in dealing with
piracy and sea robbery. It has largely overcome the difficulties of maintaining
law and order in a large and diverse maritime area that includes parts of the
Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and the Sulu and Celebes Seas around
East Malaysia. Unresolved obstacles to Malaysia’s security efforts include the
lack of a full suite of maritime boundaries around East Malaysia, and of an
EEZ boundary with Indonesia in the Malacca Strait. The lack of the latter
boundary means that what Indonesia might regard as enforcement against
illegal fishing by Malaysian vessels might be regarded as piracy by Malaysia.
The Philippines is a large archipelagic country, which faces major
problems in providing and maintaining control in its more remote island
groups, particularly in the southern part of the country. Numerous small inlets
and islands and a weak navy and coast guard add to the difficulties of
providing an acceptable level of maritime security. The Philippines is
particularly concerned about the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons,
illegal migration, piracy, cross-border kidnappings, smuggling of narcotics, as
well as precursor chemicals for narcotics and explosives.24 Fighting maritime
crime is a task mainly for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), although it
23
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suffers in the competition for resources with other elements of the Philippine
Armed Forces.

Multilateral Law Enforcement

Considerable progress has been made in Southeast Asia over recent
years in developing regional responses to the threats of piracy and sea
robbery, although cooperative measures to deal with other forms of maritime
crime are less well developed. Cooperative operational arrangements in the
Malacca and Singapore straits, such as MALSINDO (Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia) to coordinate naval patrols, the “Eyes in the Sky” project to
provide cooperative air surveillance, and a joint coordinating committee to
oversee these arrangements are well established. However, the littoral states,
especially Indonesia and Malaysia, remain firm that there is no role for the
user states in patrolling the straits.25 Embryonic operational cooperation is
also developing in the Sulu and Celebes Seas between Indonesia, Malaysia,
and the Philippines. However, problems of governance, inter-agency
coordination and the lack of resources remain, especially in Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand.
Another significant development is the IMO-sponsored meeting
process on security, safety, and environmental protection arrangements in the
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Malacca and Singapore straits. This began with the Jakarta meeting in
September 2005 and continued with meetings in Kuala Lumpur in September
2006 and in Singapore in September 2007. It provides a regular forum for
dialogue between stakeholders, comprising the littoral countries, the user
states, relevant international organizations, and the international shipping
industry. The most recent meeting in Singapore agreed to establish a
“Cooperative Mechanism” for navigational safety, security, and
environmental protection in the straits, comprising a forum for regular
dialogue, a committee to coordinate and manage specific projects, and a fund
to receive and manage voluntary financial contributions from the shipping
industry and user states.26
The ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL) meetings deal
with the preventive, enforcement and operational aspects of cooperation
against transnational crime, including piracy and all forms of smuggling, as
well as matters relating to terrorism. However, the sharing of information and
joint operational policing activity against maritime crime in the region
remains underdeveloped. This is partly due to a lack of trust and common
accord between ASEAN countries and their dialogue partners, especially
where issues of sovereignty or domestic sensitivities over organized crime and
corruption may be involved. This is often the case as transnational crime
investigations can easily conflict with the ASEAN principle of “non26
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interference in the internal affairs of one another.”27 Interstate cooperation
against crime invariably requires some surrendering of sovereignty. Also, in
some countries, corrupt officials may be directly or indirectly involved in the
criminal activities, and thus will be reluctant to risk exposure through
inquiries by external investigators. The lack of extradition treaties between
regional countries is another fundamental problem.
Despite much rhetoric, there has been some hesitancy at the Track One
level in dealing too specifically with transnational organized crime in
Southeast Asia. At the Track Two level, the Council for Security Cooperation
in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) has had working groups and study groups dealing
with some aspect of transnational crime. These groups have produced at least
two memorandums dealing with transnational crime, which have helped in
drawing attention to particular issues.28

Problems of Securitization and Governance

27

Amitav Acharya, “Preventive Diplomacy: Concept, Theory and Strategy,” in Desmond Ball
and Amitav Acharya (eds), The Next Stage—Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation
in the Asia-Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 131, (Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1999), 106.
28
“The Relationship Between Terrorism and Transnational Crime,” CSCAP Memorandum
No.7, July 2003, and “Trafficking of Firearms in the Asia Pacific Region – The Way Ahead:
Building on Regional Cooperation,” CSCAP Memorandum unnumbered, May 2004.

Piracy and sea robbery have largely been securitized in the region.29 The
threats have become the medium for new initiatives for collective and common
security. But in effect, securitizing the problems of transnational crime has
elevated them to the political level where grand statements can be made but little
action occurs. As Emmers has observed, ASEAN “has failed to act upon the
issue of transnational crime due to domestic factors, including the role of
corruption, vested interests and a lack of resources, but also because of its own
consensus model and in-built resistance to institutional reforms.”30 The ASEAN
principle, already mentioned, of non-interference in each other’s affairs might be
added to this list of factors.
Securitizing the threat has also led to an environment of increased
military spending whereby capabilities are acquired ostensibly to fight terrorism
and piracy whereas the real purpose is more purely military. When developing
countries in the region should be pursuing programs to drive down poverty and
social unrest and remove root causes of piracy and terrorism, they are being
pressed to increase defence spending to provide greater security, especially at
sea. These militarized approaches have high opportunity costs and set back
development initiatives that might alleviate root causes of criminal activity and
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social unrest. A law enforcement response to maritime crime is preferable to one
based on the projection of military power.
Lack of good governance is evident both in the causes of a breakdown in
law and order at sea and in the ability of governments to deal with disorder when
it occurs. And it seems that the further away is the seat of national government,
the greater the problems of governance, including graft and corruption. These
factors lead to increased maritime crime. For example, the barter trade between
the southern Philippines and neighboring countries is unregulated, considerable
quantities of dutiable goods are smuggled across borders, there is no patrolling
of any strength in border areas, appropriate security legislation and regulations
are not in place, and there is no effective national system for tracking small
vessels used for criminal activity or stolen from other jurisdictions.
Levels of governance over particular areas prone to criminal activities
are other factors that have influenced the extent and nature of maritime crime in
Southeast Asia. For example, between the World Wars, American authorities
appear to have exercised fairly effective control in the Sulu archipelago. More
recently however, lower standards of governance have led to an apparent
upsurge in maritime crime in this area, notably armed robbery, kidnappings, and
smuggling. Social unrest, nationalism, and political extremism, as well as porous
and inadequately controlled maritime borders, add new dimensions to the
situation.

Conclusions

A re-examination of the contemporary situation with piracy and sea
robbery in Southeast Asia has shown that the people involved in piracy and
other illegal activity at sea in Southeast Asia are often the same, even though
the offences involved might be different. They range from local fishermen or
unemployed villagers, to the on-shore criminal infrastructure supporting
piracy and maritime crime, and the offshore financiers, facilitators, and
beneficiaries of such activities. Countries outside the region, like the United
States, have tended to promote military solutions to the problems of piracy
and sea robbery when more emphasis should probably be placed on civil law
enforcement against maritime crime generally.
Rather than seeing piracy and sea robbery in isolation, these crimes
should be regarded as part of a continuum of maritime crime that also includes
the various types of smuggling, illegal fishing, and unlawful pollution of the
marine environment. For this reason, the prevention of maritime crime is
primarily a matter of civil law enforcement onshore, rather than one requiring
a military response at sea. Piracy and sea robbery attacks should be subject to
the same criminal investigation procedures as other forms of criminal activity.
Of course, greater efforts are required to promote cooperation to deal
with transnational organized crime in the region. External assistance should be
increased to assist regional countries in the following areas:



To improve security in ports, anchorages, and port approaches where the
vast majority of incidents of sea robbery occur;



To adopt stronger measures to control trafficking in small arms and light
weapons in the region;



To address governance and inter-agency coordination, particularly in
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand;



To investigate the on-shore infrastructure supporting maritime crime, as
well as the financing, facilitation, and beneficiaries of maritime crime;
and



To resolve maritime boundaries within the region as soon as possible
to ensure that jurisdiction might properly be exercised at sea.
Assuming sea boundaries cannot be resolved, provisional
arrangements for law enforcement in the disputed areas should be
entered into on a bilateral basis and without prejudice to the boundary
negotiations.
The developing countries of the region, particularly the large

archipelagic states of Indonesia and the Philippines, lack the capacity to deal
with maritime crime in the extensive waters under their national jurisdiction,
including in ports and anchorages. They have other priorities of poverty
alleviation and development and should not be encouraged to increased
expenditure on military forces rather than on other forms of development.
They require assistance to build their capacity to deal with maritime crime but

this should be directed more towards civilian agencies concerned with
maritime crime and port security rather than towards the military. Finally,
there remains a fundamental need for international cooperation to redress the
fundamental causes of piracy and maritime criminality in the region, such as
depressed social conditions, poverty, and unemployment.

